5 - A - 9

Exp 0274

I N D I C E

Nº INTERNO	ARCHIVO	DOCUMENTO
Ø266	5-A-9	Centro de Análisis Naval EEUU.
Ø267	"	Estudio sobre grado de alistamiento y preavisos mínimos y necesarios para el planeamiento de operaciones y despliegue de las unidades Submarinas.
Ø271	"	Ley de Defensa.
Ø272	"	Informe Tte. Marcelo VIGNOLLES (Comisión Agrup.Naval Malvinas)
Ø274	"	Doctrina británica.
Ø276	"	GFH de CFT 40 a COOP y GRANVILLE
Ø282	"	Informe de DISA s/conclusiones sanidad en combate.
Ø288	"	Informe del DEHE referente equipo del personal embarcado.
Ø289	"	Informe de la Escuadra Aeronaval Nº 1 relacionado con lanzamiento de torpedo.
Ø290	"	Informe de la Escuadrilla Aeronaval del Reconocimiento s/vuelos efectuados.
Ø291	"	Informe del Dpto. "B" JEIN s/publicación de EE.UU.
Ø328	"	Análisis del Conflictoefectuado un Alte. de BRASIL.
Ø331	"	Apuntes de la ESGN de España relacionados con el conflicto.
Ø332	"	Idem anterior.
Ø333	"	" "
Ø549	"	Guíado de emergencia del submarino clase SALTA.

C. O. A. C.
EXPTE. INTERNO Nº ∅274

C. O. A. C.
ARCHIVO Nº 5-A-9

CLASIFICADO

C.O.A.C.
EXPTE. INTERNO Nº Ø274
C.O.A.C.
ARCHIVO Nº 5-A-9

FOLIO Nº 1

SERIAL 6

STAFF COLLEGES

JOINT SERVICES 1

COMBAT SURVIVAL

'The men who went into Korea, against the tanks and minds of the Communist forces had not been given a hint regarding Red brain warfare. This is what gave the Communist interrogation and indoctrination machine the expectation of easy propaganda pickings amongst the captives.'

'Brain Washing'. Edward Hunter.

INTRODUCTION

1. This precis serves as an introduction to a lecture by Brigadier Farrar-Hockley on Wednesday, 14 July 1971 based on his experiences as a prisoner of war in Korea and a presentation by Headquarters Special Air Service on escape and evasion.

2. The term Combat Survival is frequently used incorrectly. Combat Survival may be defined as the whole phase of operations between the time an individual loses contact with his own forces until contact is regained either through release, rescue or escape.

3. Combat Survival has 2 main aspects:

a. Escape and evasion.

b. Conduct after capture.

CLASIFICADO

AIM

4. The aim of this precis is to study Communist methods of interrogation and indoctrination and to consider possible methods of resistance. The techniques of escape and evasion are not discussed.

DEFINITIONS

5. Interrogation. The systematic extraction of information from a subject.

6. Indoctrination. Imbuing with a doctrine, idea or opinion. Indoctrination was carried out in varying degrees by the North Koreans and Chinese during the Korean War in an attempt to convert prisoners to Communism.

7. Brain Washing. The cleansing or purging of the mind of established ideas by persistent and intensive psychological pressures culminating in the replacing of these ideas by others; usually for the purpose of rendering the subject docile and willing to confess to imaginary crimes at a public trial.

8. Although, in the British philosophy, interrogation and indoctrination are 2 separate matters, Communists do not make such a clear distinction. A prisoner may well find that an effort to extract military intelligence may develop into an attempt at conversion to Communism. The reverse is equally true. For example:

'I gave him my number, rank and name. After pressing me for some more little time he said: 'Very well I will not ask you for military information... all I want you to tell me is your opinion of the Brigadier General in command

FOLIO No 2 C.O.A.C.

of your brigade? What is his character?'. I protested that these were not questions that I could answer: they were purely military questions. Finally thinking, perhaps that I was fearful of discovery, he said: 'Do not worry. If you think these are secret things, we shall not give you away. Only the 2 of us will know what you have told me.' The argument continued for a short time, but ended when I refused to speak to him. After a long silence he said: 'The whole of your attitude is quite wrong. Let me explain to you how it is wrong - and why. When you understand this you will be ready to cooperate with us I am sure.' He began to explain how the capital states ... had engineered a war in Korea to whip up feeling against the 'democratic' states of the COMINFORM bloc. It seemed I was merely a pawn .... I had been liberated ..... I was now in the hands of a truly democratic and humanitarian government.'

'The Edge of the Sword'. Anthony Farrar-Hockley.

INTERROGATION

PRELIMINARY

9. Before a prisoner is interrogated, the Communists have carried out a great deal of preliminary work. The prisoner may well be unaware that this is happening or the reasons for it.

a. Research. The Communist powers maintain a continuous process of research by covert and overt intelligence gathering on personalities and individuals. This information is probably stored in a central computor and can be quickly extracted and passed to interrogators anywhere in the world. When the results of this research are presented to a prisoner the surprise that his captors have such a detailed knowledge of his background can be very shattering to his morale. Students should be aware that Communist captors of most officers and NCOs will know:

(1) Many details of his career.

(2) His home background.

(3) His habits, customs and political opinions.

(4) Details of any deviation from the normal in his financial or marital affairs.

b. Conditioning. Except in the case of primary interrogation at brigade or regimental level a captor will condition his prisoner before beginning interrogation. There are 3 major facets to conditioning:

(1) Environmental. By providing squalid and sordid surroundings and by providing inadequate heating, latrines, washing facilities, lighting and ventilation facilities.

(2) Physical. Physical conditioning normally takes the form of long term physical discomfort allied with the deprivation of medical care, food and water. Examples of this type of conditioning are:

FOLIO No 3
C.O.A.C.

Trussing
Handcuffing
Caging
Long periods of standing, sitting or squatting in uncomfortable positions.

(3) Normally a Communist captor will not resort to severe physical torture. He is well aware that information he gains this way may be forced and given merely to obtain an end to the torture. There are occasions however when he will use physical torture if he knows a prisoner has vital information and he has been unable to extract it by normal interrogation.

(4) Mental Conditioning. The captors will assault a prisoner's mind in any or all of the following ways:

(a) Harassment and humiliation.

(b) Incessant questioning.

(c) Use of direct and indirect suggestion.

(d) Isolation.

(e) Deprivation of sleep.

(f) Sensory deprivation by removing from the prisoner all sense of time, feeling, sight, sounds etc. It is in this field that most research is now being carried out.

c. Selection. Interrogation is a long term and slow process. A captor will employ some method of selection to determine the order in which to interrogate the prisoners and if the interrogation organization is saturated, which prisoners to interrogate. Selection will be based on:

(1) Those men who are likely to have the required information.

(2) Which of the men described above are most likely to divulge this information.

It is during the selection process that a captor will assess, together with the results of his research the type and sequence of interrogation to use.

d. Display of Efficiency. The enemy will make every effort to impress his prisoners who are already depressed by their capture with ruthless efficiency.

e. The following are examples of physical conditioning and selection:

(1) Physical Conditioning. 'Afterwards we were taken to an old mine shaft that had been made into a prison. It was so crowded that we took turns in sleeping. The floor on which we lay was soaking wet and water dripped from the ceiling. We were kept there for a few days until Chinese guards came to get us. We were tied

FOLIO No 4
C O A C

to each other and led along a track ..... The guard made us kneel and walked behind us with his pistol cocked, I don't know if he was bluffing or if he changed his mind. Still tied we were taken to a house and made to kneel on the cement floor .... If we slipped we were beaten back onto our knees. Next day we were taken to another house where we were bound with ropes that pulled our arms high and tight in back. We were kept like this for 3 days and nights. Our hands were loosened for 10 minutes or so every day so that we could eat. I wish they hadn't for the blisters rose at once where the ropes had cut. Then they retied us with a half square knot that drew so tight that it straightened out your clenched fist. The rope was attached to the roof so that if you moved the knot tightened.

Next day they retied us the first way and we were kept like this for about 2 weeks. The ropes were loosened for about 15 minutes a day. Then we were separated and were given no food for a week. Immediately after this the Communists began to interrogate and indoctrinate us.'

Technical Master Sergeant R Wilkins,
United States Air Force.

(2) <u>Selection</u>. It is during the selection process that a captor will assess, together with the results of his research the type and sequence of interrogation to use. A variation of this system is reported in 'The Special Intelligence Report on Repatriated Prisoners of War' published by Army Headquarters Indian Army in 196[illegible].

'Shortly after the capture the prisoners were marched to collecting points. They were also given a meal which in some cases was their first for 6 or 8 days. While there the prisoners were subjected to their first interrogation and in general completed a form in which they listed their units, formations, next of kin, social and economic status and the names of their commanders. By reassuring the prisoners with their kind attitude the Chinese applied the first softening up process; thereby introducing the initial phase of interrogation .... From the study of the forms completed by the prisoners and assessment of the initial interrogation the Chinese adopted a system of selective interrogation. The techniques used for this interrogation were deception, harassment, repetition, implied threats, biographies, essays, fears and walking conferences.' (Walking conference is a term for a form of interrogation in which the prisoner and his interrogator go, apparently for a stroll outside the campduring which the interrogator tries to carry on a normal social conversation).

<u>TYPES OF INTERROGATION</u>

10. As a result of the selection process and by observation during conditioning the captor will decide the type of interrogation to adopt. Trained interrogators are extremely flexible characters and can vary their approach and technique to suit the prisoner. The main techniques may be divided into:

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 51
C.O.A.C.

a. Cold, persistent, heartless.

b. Bullying and hectoring.

c. Apparently foolish.

d. Kind and sympathetic.

11. The main material aids likely to be used by an interrogator are:

a. Microphones.

b. Tape recorders.

c. Two-way mirrors.

d. Stool-pigeons for example.

'He was kept in solitary confinement for 3 weeks. During his confinement he was savagely beaten and tortured. When he returned to the compound he was morally and physically broken. He told the other officers never to discuss anything in his presence as he had been sent back to act as an informer and threatened with worse torture if he did not comply. His treatment had left him very weak and he no longer had any will to live ..... and he eventually died about 2 weeks after his release.'

Description of an unnamed American Officer.

12. The interrogator will carefully pre-plan every interrogation. He will base his plan on his wide and deep knowledge of human nature backed up by his knowledge of the individual built up during conditioning and selection. He will be prepared to change his plan instantly if he discovers any human weakness in the prisoners. He will then exploit this weakness by taunt, ridicule, insult and the exploitation of everything the prisoner holds sacred.

INDOCTRINATION

13. Indoctrination may be carried out in concert with interrogation or as a separate operation. In either event a prisoner will be conditioned as for interrogation.

14. The first phase of indoctrination is to destroy an individual's established ideas and loyalty and to sow such seeds of doubt in his mind that he becomes mentally isolated from his fellow prisoners. This is likely to be achieved by:

a. The abolition of normal discipline by segregating officers, NCOs and soldiers.

b. The destruction of the normal military command system.

c. The exploiting of any existing dissensions.

d. The creation of new dissensions. A typical example, (which failed), was the exploitation of the normal mild dissension existing between British and United States soldiers. The extent of the failure may be seen in this quotation.

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA FOLIO No 6 C.O.A.C.

'At the time they figured the Coronation was starting, about 25 Britons - all in their particular compound - gathered in a squad room while a dozen Americans stationed themselves at strategic points as look outs. At the exact moment they calculated the crown being placed on their Lady Sovereign's head they sang God Save the Queen. They let go at this moment, singing at the tops of their voices. The Chinese rushed in, but were too late, the British had had their Coronation service and the Americans had had a hand in it.'

15. Once the first phase has discredited the prisoner and mentally separated him from his fellow prisoners, he will be offered Communism in a specially appealing form of salvation. This will be allied to:

a. The creation of self disgust or guilt by argument, taunt or ridicule.

b. Expulsion from group loyalty by his fellow prisoners.

TRUTH DRUGS

16. Background. There are, in general, wide misconceptions about the value of so called truth drugs. Pyschiatrists have known for many years that if a man has had an extremely painful experience his mind will push the memory of this experience to the back (figuratively) of his brain and will erect a mental barrier in front of this memory. In order to treat emotional disturbances arising from this painful experience pyschiatrists must bring the memory of the experience out. They have found that certain drugs help in this. The effect of these drugs is to a large extent similar to the effects of alcohol; indeed many of these drugs are chemically related to alcohol.

17. Implication in Interrogation.

a. Interrogators, knowing of the success psychiatrists have had with these drugs consider that if such drugs can destroy or reduce an involuntary mental barrier perhaps they could reduce the voluntary barrier created by a man determined not to release information.

b. Experiments have been carried out; these have not fulfilled the interrogator's hopes for the following reasons:

(1) The conditions existing in the quiet confidential atmosphere of a consulting room, where the man and the psychiatrist are working together for a common aim, are completely different from those of the interrogation centre where the man and the interrogator are involved in a mental struggle.

(2) The physical and mental side effects of these drugs often have undesirable results; eg loss of memory; violent change of behaviour.

(3) If a drug is successful in reducing the mental barrier the subject may produce:

(a) The truth.

ESTADO MAYOR DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO Nº 7
C. A. C.

(b) Astonishing mental fantasies.

(c) An overwhelming desire to talk.

The truth may appear but it will be buried in a mass of verbiage that will take an interrogator a very long time to sort out.

18. Conclusion. In some cases so called truth drugs may be of value as an aid to interrogation, but probably, as with physical violence, only as a last resort on specially selected prisoners under carefully controlled conditions. Alcohol may have a very valuable place in the interrogator's armoury. A new drug that is now available is tasteless and a minute dose of this in coffee or tea makes an individual quite uninhibited and gives a feeling of relaxed, well-being.

19. Drugs may be used as a form of torture or threat. A prisoner may be given a small dose of a drug that has violent and unpleasant results or that produces temporary insanity. He may then be threatened that this will be repeated with larger doses if he does not cooperate.

RESISTANCE TO INTERROGATION AND INDOCTRINATION

20. Resistance to Interrogation.

a. Knowledge. All ranks must know what to expect. If they do then their treatment loses part of its shock value.

b. Number, Rank, Name and Date of Birth. This is the only information that a prisoner should give his captor. Prisoners must be made aware that not only are they being interrogated but that they are also being selected for further questioning, those who refuse all information may be regarded as unsuitable for further questioning, however a prisoner should reply with a polite affirmative (or negative) to questions of personal administration. An example is given at the end of this paragraph.

c. Physical Torture. Prisoners must be taught that an interrogator regards information obtained under torture as of doubtful value, therefore although the threat of torture may be used, torture itself is used as seldom as possible.

d. Attitude. Prisoners should adopt a correct and patient attitude to their interrogator.

e. Playing Dumb. Time should be taken in replying to questions. Words should be slurred and exhaustion simulated.

f. False Information. An interrogator will probably be able to detect false information. The use of false information is a double edged weapon; in order to give it the prisoner must talk, once he begins to do so he is playing into the interrogator's hands.

g. Documents. No document should be signed as it is a simple matter to transfer the signature to a 'confession' or similar document for use later.

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA FOLIO No 8 C.O.A.C.

h. Reading. Nothing should be read aloud. Tape recorders will almost certainly be in use and the record thus made can be altered to suit the interrogator's needs.

i. Bribes. Food, drink and tobacco should be accepted provided they are not bribes. They will help sustain the body.

j. Example. An example of one form of interrogation is given below:

'We sat there for 9 hours; I thought Hui would never tire. Later in the afternoon 6 young Chinese were brought in - apprentice commissars, as I later discovered - ..... I sat with my back to the entrance; the others at 90 degrees to me on either side, gazed at Hui seated with his back to the rear wall. I began to feel as if we were all listening to some interminable after dinner speaker; one of those men who can neither retain the interest of his audience nor bring himself to sit down. I was able to stand it until he came to the subject of the British Commonwealth and in particular, the United Kingdom. After he had spoken of the oppression of our people and the conditions of slave labour that abounded throughout British industry I could take no more. A flood of words burst from me which no protest of his could stop. I assured him we did not believe every word published in the newspapers ..... I reminded him that we had no political prisoners ..... that we had only given a light sentence of imprisonment to Mr Willy Gallacher ..... I said a great deal more and I fear I spoke with a great deal of passion. I walked back through the darkness with my guards calling myself all sorts of fool. By design or accident I had been drawn into an argument with my interrogators from which I should have remained aloof. Little did I know what the consequences of that mid-night argument were to be.'

Anthony Farrar-Hockley.

21. Resistance to Indoctrination.

a. The Geneva Convention. All ranks should know the provisions of this convention. The Communists are very likely to produce a garbled version in an effort to persuade men to cooperate.

b. Morale. Indoctrination may continue over a period of years. Morale in prison camps must be built up after the devastating effect of capture. The main ingredients of this form of morale are:

(1) Discipline. As far as possible the normal chain of discipline must be maintained. If soldiers are invited to elect camp committees they must elect their military superior. If the camp authorities insist on juniors being appointed, prisoners must continue to look to their military superiors for guidance and leadership.

(2) Appearance. It is the duty of all officers and NCOs to insist, as far as it is in their power, on the maintenance of cleanliness and of military bearing.

(3) Behaviour. The outward signs of military discipline,

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 9
C.O.A.C.

saluting, standing to attention, military titles etc must be maintained for as long as possible.

(4) Personal. Those who have endured periods of indoctrination say that they have been strengthened in their long and lonely battle with their captors by one or more of the following factors:

(a) A belief in their own strength of character.

(b) Pride.

(c) Family loyalty and the thought that a normal happy family life still exists.

(d) A belief that release will come.

(5) Group Morale. Although normal groups and group loyalties are broken up by the Communists new group loyalties grow. Some of these groups are overt and some covert. All ex-prisoners agree that any form of group feeling strengthens an individual's power to resist. Some examples from Korea were:

(a) An undetected Masonic group amongst American prisoners.

(b) The Golden Cross Club, formed by American negro soldiers.

(c) 'The Reds divided us into small study groups the easier to control and indoctrinate us. The group spirit grew up whenever we devised ways of outwitting the brain washer, making a farce of learning. A sense of loyalty at this game was all the stronger because it sprouted in such a normal healthy way.'

(6) Religion. 'Group feelings could never be crushed entirely in the religious field. When Sam Davies the British 'chaplain of the church in captivity' as the prisoners called him was thrust into solitary confinement the men gathered defiantly anyway and sang so loudly he would have had to be stone deaf not to have heard them. Tough top sergeants as well as businessmen told me of the effectiveness of prayer in making them feel part of an unconquerable body, beside which Communism was very puny indeed.' Only one, Sam Davies, of the 4 padres taken prisoner survived. Clearly the Communists realise the great danger that religion poses to their plans.

(7) Humour. 'High jinks was the most appropriate word I could find for a stamina giving element that brought the full force of humour into action, alongside several other stimulating elements, such as deceit and adaptability. Crazy week was high jinks at its best. Stunts of that sort were particularly effective against Red morale, at the same time as raising that of their victims. The indoctrinator was left wondering whether he was being flattered or insulted, and while he had a humiliated feeling over it he wasn't able to do a thing because it would have made him lose more face.' Some examples of this sort of behaviour in the Korean War were:

(a) A group of British NCOs who played imaginary billiards on

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 10
C. O. A. C.

a non-existent table, they continually flustered the guards by accusing them of bumping into the table or nudging a cue as a shot was being taken.

(b) An American group who played 'crap' without dice or money.

(c) An Allied group of officers who were found by the guard during a night snap check to be carrying on normal activities of reading, playing cards and sewing in the pitch dark.

(d) An Allied group of NCOs who hid outside their hut at reveille. The guard ran to fetch reinforcements, while he was away they all returned to bed, blew out the lamp and were discovered by the reinforced guard a few moments later as if they had never been roused.

2. USA Training System. As a result of their experiences in Korea the United States Army has been giving much more emphasis to its training in Resistance to Interrogation and Indoctrination than in the past. This has taken 3 main forms:

a. Pre Enlistment Training. The Service Departments have, with some measure of success, tried to persuade the Civil Departments to increase training atchildren's schools in Citizenship, Individual Responsibility and similar subjects.

b. The Code of Conduct. In order to impress upon all ranks their individual responsibility a short, simple Code of Conduct has been devised. This lays down clearly the standard of conduct expected from soldiers if captured. All soldiers are required to know and understand the code, and every soldier must carry a 'wallet' copy of the code with him. The contents are continually stressed in Service broadcasts, newspapers and films. A copy of the Code of Conduct is at Annex B. Students may like to consider whether the issues of a similar type of Code of Conduct to British Soldiers would be an advantage.

c. Unit Training. Many units now run Resistance training days where the soldiers are exposed to the type of treatment and conditions they could expect to receive if captured by the Communists. This training is, of necessity, very rough and hard and needs very careful supervision by the Commanding Officer and his medical officer.

23. The problems of resistance to interrogation and indoctrination become more and more acute as enemy techniques improve. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that in future by the use of drugs and sensory deprivation information may be obtained from any prisoner in a matter of 2 or 3 hours.

CONCLUSION

24. The treatment of prisoners taken in the Sino/Indian campaign, in Vietnam and in the Pueblo incident shows that the Communists have not altered their methods of interrogation and indoctrination since the Korean War. We now know their methods and systems. We must ensure that British troops are never again unprepared to face these problems.

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA FOLIO No 11 O.A.C.

'Forever hence, he must know the traps that are set for him by mind attack ..... The tools of mind attack include food, fear, fatigue and deception. He must be prepared for these. He must be trained in the defences against the planned disintegration of his will. He must know how to handle the tools that can guard the well being and integrity of his mind.'

Edward Hunter.

RECOMMENDED READING

'The Edge of the Sword'. Anthony Farrar-Hockley.
'Brain Washing, The Story of Men Who Defied It'. Edward Hunter.

Annexes:

A. Fusilier Kinnes' Experience.
B. United States Army 'Code of Conduct'.

FOLIO No 12

ANNEX A TO
SERIAL 6

EXTRACT FROM
TREATMENT OF BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR IN KOREA

CITATIONS FOR GALLANTRY IN CAPTIVITY

GEORGE CROSS

22105517 Fusilier DEREK GODFREY KINNE, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers.

In August, 1950, Fusilier Kinne volunteered for service in Korea. He joined the 1st Battalion, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, and was captured by Chinese Communist Forces on April 25, 1951, the last day of the Imjim River Battle. From then on he had only two objects in mind; firstly to escape and secondly by his contempt for his captors and their behaviour, and his utter disregard for the treatment meted out to him, to raise the morale of his fellow-prisoners. The treatment which he received during his period of captivity is summarised in the succeeding paragraphs.

Fusilier Kinne escaped for the first time within 24 hours of capture but was retaken a few days later while attempting to regain our own lines. Eventually he rejoined a large group of prisoners being marched north to prison camps and, despite the hardships of this march, which lasted a month, rapidly emerged as a man of outstanding leadership and very high morale.

In July, 1952, Fusilier Kinne, who was by now well known to his captors, was accused by them of being non-co-operative and was brutally interrogated about other prisoners of war who had unco-operative views. As a result of his refusal to inform on his comrades, and for striking back at a Chinese officer who assaulted him, he was twice severely beaten-up and tied up for periods of 12 and 24 hours, being made to stand on tip-toe with a running noose round his neck which would throttle him if he attempted to relax in any way.

He escaped on July 27 but was recaptured two days later. He was again beaten up very severely and placed in handcuffs (which could be and frequently were tightened so as to restrict circulation), from which he was not released until October 16, 1952, a period of 81 days.

He was accused of insincerity, a hostile attitude towards the Chinese, 'sabotage' of compulsory political study, escape, and of being reactionary. From August 15 to 20 he was confined in a very small box cell, where he was made to sit to attention all day, being periodically beaten, prodded with bayonets, kicked and spat upon by the guards, and denied any washing facilities.

On August 20, 1952, he was made to stand to attention for seven hours and when he complained was beaten by the Chinese guard commander with the butt of a sub-machine gun, which eventually went off and killed the guard commander. For this Fusilier Kinne was beaten senseless with belts and bayonets, stripped of his clothes, and thrown into a dank rat-infested hole until September 19. He was frequently taken out and beaten, including once (on September 16), with pieces of planking until he was unconscious.

On October 16, Fusilier Kinne was tried by a Chinese military court for escape and for being a reactionary and hostile to the Chinese, and was sentenced to twelves months' solitary confinement. This was increased to eighteen months

FOLIO No 13 C.O.A.C.

ANNEX A TO
SERIAL 6

when he complained at his trial of denial of medical attention, including that for a severe double hernia which he had sustained in June, 1952, while trying to escape.

On December 5, 1952, he was transferred to a special penal company. His last award of solitary confinement was on June 2, 1953, when he was sentenced for defying Chinese orders and wearing a rosette in celebration of Coronation Day.

He was eventually exchanged at Panmunjom on August 10, 1953. As late as August 8 and 9 he was threatened with non-repatriation for demanding an interview with the International Red Cross Representatives who were visiting prisoner-of-war camps.

Fusilier Kinne was during the course of his periods of solitary confinement kept in no less than seven different places of imprisonment, including a security police gaol, under conditions of the most extreme degradation and increasing brutality. Every possible method both physical and mental was employed by his captors to break his spirit, a task which proved utterly beyond their powers. Latterly he must have been fully aware that every time he flaunted his captors and showed openly his detestation of themselves and their methods he was risking his life. He was in fact several times threatened with death or non-repatriation. Nevertheless he was always determined to show that he was prepared neither to be intimidated nor cowed by brutal treatment at the hands of a barbarous enemy.

His powers of resistance and his determination to oppose and fight the enemy to the maximum were beyond praise. His example was an inspiration to all ranks who came into contact with him.

STAFF COLLEGES

SERIAL 7

FOLIO Nº 17 C.G.A.C.

Traducido a fs 25

JOINT SERVICES 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

> "The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence." MAO TSE-TUNG 1929.

1. Psychological Operations (psyops) is an all-embracing term defined by NATO as 'planned psychological activities in peace and war directed towards enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to create attitudes and behaviour favourable to the achievement of political and military objectives.' In time of war psyops includes strategic and tactical psychological warfare (psywar) and psychological consolidation (see Paragraph 19) and encompasses those political, military, economic, ideological and information activities designed to achieve the results desired.

2. The concept of Deterrence can be said to be a form of psyops when related to the definition above. This form of psyops is not new; governments and military commanders have combined the application of force with the psychological effects of the use of that force through the ages.

3. Among some members of the British Services there is a tendency to treat the subject with suspicion, even disdain, and to regard psyops as a form of warfare conducted only by political officers and specialist military staffs. The term 'psychological operations' lends itself to misinterpretation, but no better or more descriptive words have been found and the title is used and understood internationally.

4. Psyops can affect members of the Armed Forces at all levels; visits by HM ships to Commonwealth, allied or foreign ports may influence local attitudes to our advantage; a flypast of strike aircraft and/or a timely flag march through a troubled town or area by military forces may, by their presence, create a favourable impression on the minds of the people and forestall riots and civil disorders. Psyops can also involve individual officers and servicemen, for example, prisoners taken by a power which is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention have, in the past, been exploited for propaganda purposes. Nor must it be forgotten that activities primarily intended, to win over the population, commonly referred to as 'Hearts and Minds' tasks, are a form of psyops. These activities may involve any unit or individual of the Armed Forces and take many different forms. Well conducted activities of this nature can have a decisive influence on the successful outcome of a counter-insurgency campaign or peacekeeping operation.

5. For the reasons outlined above, commanders and staff officers must appreciate the potential uses of psyops, especially against a background of tactical operations on land and when countering insurgency or a state of disorder.

THE THREAT

6. Communist parties in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have never concealed their aim of World Communism. They wage a continual propaganda campaign to effect this. Where governments and populations are amenable a propaganda

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 15
C.O.A.C.

campaign using the various forms of information media open to them is usually sufficient for their goals to be achieved. Once in power the necessary controls over the machinery of government, especially the information media, are imposed to maintain a Communist regime.

7. Where, however, the government and civil population are against Communism, or are apathetic to it, stronger measures become necessary. These can take many forms, from terror and coercion to face-to-face persuasion conducted by agents or dedicated revolutionaries. At the same time military operations, probably in guerilla form, may be waged against government security forces.

8. Whenever there is a movement or plot to overthrow a government or established society or order the revolutionary leaders know that in the final analysis, they cannot succeed without winning the support of the civil population. Revolutionary leaders such as Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung, were and are fully aware of this. Ever since they and other such leaders committed their ideas to paper, revolutionaries and nationalist insurgents have devoted at least as much effort to achieving political success as military. The early Soviet revolutionaries used the newspaper to spread their doctrines. In more modern times, the development of radio, and particularly of the cheap transistor receiver, has provided these with access to, and control of, broadcasting facilities, a medium through which the minds of millions can be influenced. Radio will undoubtedly be superseded by television when the latter is more widely distributed.

9. Nationalists, whether communist or not, follow the general pattern of Communist revolutionary warfare, because it has proved a successful method of fighting superior and better equipped military forces. It has also shown the importance of securing the support and willing co-operation of the civil population.

10. In the various wars and insurgencies of the twentieth century, many countries have been slow to recognize and counter the methods adopted by hostile elements to secure for themselves the active support of or at worst, the neutrality, of the people. All too often some countries have misappreciated the power and appeal of hostile propaganda and its effect on the minds of the people. All too often attention was directed towards the defeat of the military arm, whilst the political arm continued its energetic activities almost unopposed. One of the most noteworthy examples in the post Second World War era is that of the French in Indo China, particularly in Tonkin, now part of North Vietnam, where, despite the skill and gallantry of the French military forces, their political hold of the country was undermined by the Viet Minh almost everywhere.

11. In any Limited War or insurgency, the enemy or insurgents will seek to exploit the political situation as much as the military. By using all forms of media available to them, eg, face-to-face persuasion, radio, leaflets etc, they will try to persuade the civil population to take sides. Those who show sympathy for their cause will be encouraged with promises and given help. At the same time they will be exploited to provide food, shelter and information. Those who do not submit, unless adequately protected by the government forces, they are killed or are able to escape. To influence the attitudes of the civil population the enemy or insurgents will resort to measures such as murder, kidnapping and blackmail and they will exploit the fear of death or physical injury and other tactics which are repugnant to Western countries. Against an unprotected civil population methods such as these are effective and hard to resist.

12. With the developments in mass information media achieved since the Second

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 16
C. O. A. C.

World War, the whole of mankind has become exposed to mental attack more than ever before. It is inconceivable that in any future war, insurgency, or state of unrest, the minds of those involved will fail to be influenced by what is heard, seen and understood through mass media.

13. It is one of the tasks of the psyops staff to advise the commander how the influence of enemy or insurgent propaganda can best be countered.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STAFF AND UNITS

STAFF

14. The provision of psyops staff officers is a joint Service responsibility. Officers selected for appointments should have a broad joint Service background and if possible a knowledge of civil government. The psyops staff form part of the operations staff and the closest relationships should be maintained with intelligence staffs and Public Relations.

15. Psyops staffs are not provided on a fixed establishment; they will be included on most force headquarters (HQ) but will be few in number. For certain campaigns or operations, psyops staffs may be provided for lower HQ. A psyops staff officer must have the complete confidence of his commander and preferably direct access to him. To do their work psyops staff officers must keep themselves up to date with developments in the operational situation and must be provided with the latest intelligence.

16. The main duties of the psyops staff may be summarized as follows:

a. To advise the commander on psyops policy.

b. To carry out the planning and co-ordination of a psyops campaign within their area of responsibility.

c. To advise the commander, staffs and units on the effects of hostile propaganda.

d. To train psyops units and personnel.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNIT

17. Under current policy the Army is responsible for providing manpower and equipment for psyops units although suitable personnel of the other Services may be included in them. The psyops unit is small and equipped with vehicles carrying loudspeakers, tape recorders, cameras and, where necessary, cinema equipment. Its main function is the dissemination of propaganda through loudspeakers, leaflets, photographs and films. The work of the unit is not particularly specialized but it requires experience and demands resourcefulness and imagination. Its personnel must be highly trained in the equipment and in their role so that sudden opportunities can be exploited without delay.

RN AND RAF ROLES

18. In addition to special tasks given to the RN and RAF such as flypasts and demonstrations of military strength, there will be times when a psyops target can only be approached by sea or air. The most likely psyops requirement from the RN will be for craft from which to land psyops teams during offshore and river

FOLIO No 17
C. A. C.

operations. Inshore and river craft mounting loudspeakers may also have an important role to play and shore parties from naval vessels can make a valuable contribution to a 'Hearts and Minds' campaign. For the RAF there is likely to be a requirement for aircraft to deliver psyops teams by air, to drop leaflets and to operate loudspeakers over enemy or insurgent dominated areas.

DIVISIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

19. In a state of war or declared emergency psyops can be divided into:

a. Strategic Psywar. This is directed at whole populations. The policy is decided by the government and among its aims will be the undermining of the morale and efficiency of the enemy nation and the explanation of our own current national policy to allies and neutral nations.

b. Tactical Psywar. This is directed at enemy armed forces and civilians in the fighting zone in direct support of our military operations. Its aim is to undermine the enemy's morale and to weaken his will to resist. It also seeks to enlist the support, or at least the neutrality of any civil population in the area of operations. Tactical Psywar Policy will be derived from Strategic Psywar Policy.

c. Psychological Consolidation. This is directed entirely at the civil population. The aim is to influence and specifically gain the co-operation of civilians in the rear of, or adjacent to, the fighting forces.

20. Psyops in Internal Security and in a Counter Insurgency situation is directed at:

a. Subversive and insurgent elements, in order to lower their morale and induce them to defect.

b. The civil population, in order to:

(1) Discredit insurgents - thus depriving them of civil support.

(2) Instil confidence in, and co-operation with, the Government by keeping the people informed of measures to defeat the insurgency and improve their well-being.

21. The evaluation of its effects is difficult; prisoners of war and detainees usually provide the best indications.

RELATED AGENCIES

22. Psyops has close ties with:

a. Intelligence - on which it relies for the bulk of its information.

b. Public Relations - particularly in respect of Community Relations and in putting out fast and accurate information so as to forestall hostile propaganda.

FOLIO No 18 C.A.C.

c. Civil Political Authorities - since all psyops must be conducted within political directives.

POLICY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

23. A psyops campaign can sometimes have far-reaching and unforeseen results. Just as a smoke screen may have effects outside the boundaries of one ground force command and into another, so psyops cannot be conducted in isolation. The psyops policy for any situation will normally be decided at the highest level. When operating in any Commonwealth or foreign country it will be the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to agree the policy to be followed with the government concerned and then to issue political guidance to the Force Commander. When operating under an international organization, such as the United Nations or NATO, political guidance must be based on a consistent and practical policy which can readily be communicated and understood. The clearer the message, the easier it will be to convince the recipients. Promises should not be made unless it is possible to fulfil them, otherwise credibility, confidence and effectiveness will be lost.

24. Psyops staff officers in their planning, advice and activities must ensure that they comply with the instructions contained in the political guidance. This is especially important when dealing with the civil population for whom the local government must have ultimate responsibility. It also applies to policies such as those for dealing with hostile or insurgent groups. For example, if a psyops staff officer at a lower level decides on surrender terms of his own which may happen to suit local conditions, he may find himself clashing with the policy of the government of the country he is in. It must never be forgotten that the principles of co-operation and co-ordination apply as much to psyops as to any other military operation.

25. A possible organization to conduct psyops during a counter-insurgency campaign in a friendly country is at Annex A to this precis.

CONCLUSION

26. In its military context, and especially in the tactical and consolidation field, psyops is not a substitute for military power; nor is it a weapon to be used when all else has failed. It is another support weapon available to the commander and needs to be used in conjunction with military strength. The degree of emphasis placed on psyops in relation to military strength will vary. In some circumstances physical, as opposed to mental attack will be of over-riding importance; in others, psyops may profitably be given greater priority. There will be few military operations in which the subject can be ignored.

Annex:

A. Possible Organization for a Psychological Operation Campaign in a Friendly Country.

NOTE:

JSP7 - Psychological Operations - is due to be published in 1971/72 as part of the Manual of Joint Warfare.

MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 19
C.C.A.C.

ANNEX A TO 19
SERIAL 7

POSSIBLE ORGANIZATION FOR A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN IN A FRIENDLY COUNTRY



COMPOSITION OF PSYOPS COMMITTEE

Chairman

Government Representative

Civil Members

Representatives from:

- Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- Government Information Service
- Ministry responsible for Home Affairs
- Police (Special Branch)

Military Members

Representatives from:

- Force Commander
- Intelligence Staff
- Psyops Staff
- Public Relations Staff

Co-Opted Members

Specialists in sociology, economics, religion and industry as required.

Advice = ↑
Political Guidance = ↓

DOCTRINA - UK

ESTADO MAYOR ... DE LA ARMADA FOLIO No 20 C.I.N.C.

STAFF COLLEGES SERIAL 4

JOINT SERVICE TRAINING PERIOD

DISCUSSION PERIOD NO 2

AIM

1. The aim of Discussion Period No 2 is to:

a. Provide an opportunity for students to discuss points of interest arising from the presentations by the Joint Warfare Establishment (JWE) and from their own studies of the Manual of Joint Warfare.

b. Discuss the questions in Paragraph 2.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

2. Students are to be prepared to discuss their views on the following questions:

a. Question 1. What are the threats facing an amphibious task force approaching its objective, and how can they best be met? v88'

b. Question 2. What factors must be considered in deciding how and when to transfer command from ship to shore during an amphibious operation?

c. Question 3. Post 1971, amphibious forces will rely on afloat support and it is not intended that any base support should be provided outside the UK. What logistic support is required for an embarked military force comprising a commando brigade HQ and 2 commando groups, and what are the problems of providing it?

d. Question 4. What degree of authority does a commander require over units of another Service, for example, helicopters or maritime support aircraft?

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO 21
SERIAL 11

MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No
C.C.A.C.

AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES

1. General. The LPH, LPD, LSLs, LPA, LKA and LCHs are available for transport purposes. The vehicle loads of amphibious ships are calculated in 4 ton equivalents. For planning purposes:

$2\frac{1}{2}$ x $\frac{1}{4}$ ton veh or $\frac{1}{2}$ ton veh = 1 x 4 ton ≡

$2\frac{1}{2}$ x $\frac{3}{4}$ ton tlr or 1 ton tlr = 1 x 4 ton ≡

$1\frac{1}{2}$ x $\frac{3}{4}$ ton veh or 1 ton veh = 1 x 4 ton ≡

1 x MBT = 2 x 4 ton ≡

1 x APC = 1 x 4 ton ≡

2. The LPH (HMS ALBION).

a. The LPH can embark:

(1) One commando group of a commando, commando battery and certain support and administrative elements totalling 800 men. For short periods normally not exceeding 3 weeks, the ship can accommodate a further 400 troops. Under austere conditions, 1,650 can be embarked for up to 10 days. This is undesirable overcrowding, particularly in the New Guinea climate and would effect the ships assault capability. Numbers should be kept as near 1,200 as possible.

(2) 150 tons of military stores, of which 25 tons are stowed readily available for landing. If no vehicles are carried, military stores can be increased to 400 tons.

(3) 36 x 4 ton equivalent (90 x $\frac{1}{4}$ ton) without interfering with normal flying. Larger loads will restrict flying. The number of 4 ton vehicles should be kept to a minimum because they can only be landed, one at a time, by using the Landing Pontoon Vehicle (LPV); this is a difficult operation if there is any sort of swell. Four ton vehicles should be carried by LPD or LSL if available.

(4) Four LCVPs at davits. $\frac{1}{4}$ ton vehicles and $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trailers are normally loaded into these craft whilst they are at the davits. It is more normal to fly-in these vehicles as underslung loads.

(5) Six sets of SS 11 equipment and over 200 missiles, which can be used in the air-to-ground role by the Wessex V or by the commando anti-tank troop in a ground-to-ground role.

(6) Stocks to maintain its commando group in action ashore for 10 days at limited war rates. Sufficient stocks are also held afloat in RFAs to support a commando brigade of two commandos and appropriate support and logistic units for 30 days at limited war rates.

b. From about 10 miles from the LZ and LPH can land a company group (less vehicles) in one wave of 9 helicopters in 10 minutes and a complete commando group in about one and a half hours.

ESTADO MAYOR ... ARMADA
FOLIO 22
C.O.A.C.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
SERIAL 11

3. The LPD (HMS INTREPID). It can embark:

a. 350 troops which can be increased to a total of 650 troops under austere conditions for a period not exceeding 7 days. 500 can be carried in overload conditions.

b. Twenty tanks and 43 x 4 ton equivalents. With no tanks, 83 x 4 ton equivalents. The beach armoured recovery vehicle (BARV) of the ship's amphibious beach unit (ABU), if taken would be at the expense of one tank.

c. A battery of 6 x 105 mm guns and their prime movers could be embarked at the expense of 9 x 4 ton equivalents.

d. Fifty tons of stores, a total which can be increased to about 2,000 tons if no tanks or vehicles are carried.

e. One SRN 5 and one SRN 6 hovercraft at the expense of one helicopter operating spot.

f. Four LCM9s; 4 LCVPs; 5 DUKWs. The DUKWs are not organic to the LPD; they are embarked as part of the ABU when required. They can be parked on the dock apron and do not count against the ship's vehicle capacity.

g. A joint service ABU as part of the normal ship's company. Its vehicles other than the BARV do not count against the ship's 4 ton equivalent capacity.

Notes:

1. A LPD has joint command and communication facilities for a naval Amphibious Group Commander and a Landing Force Commander at brigade level.
2. A LPD has no helicopters of its own but there are facilities for helicopter operations by day and night, including refuelling. There are 3 operating spots.
3. A LPD carries an Amphibious Beach Unit (ABU) with a strength of 49 ranks. which is increased by 12 if the 5 DUKWs are embarked. It is a joint unit of RM, Army and a few RN personnel. Its transport includes a BARV and 2 wheeled fork lift trucks. Its task is to control and develop the selected beach. There is a requirement for 20 ranks and the BARV to land in the early stages of the assault.
4. An army signals troop of 16 ranks is embarked to man certain support and non naval radio links.
5. The ship also carries a RCT Vehicle Decks Party to supervise the loading and lashing of vehicles.

4. The LSLs (RFAs SIR GALAHAD, SIR TRISTRAM and SIR BEDIVERE). Each can embark:

a. 340 troops, which can be increased to a total of 534 troops under austere conditions. 450 is a reasonable overload figure.

b. Sixteen tanks and 34 x 4 ton equivalents. If no tanks are carried the 4 ton equivalents increase to 66.

c. 240 tons of stores, which can be increased to about 1,000 tons if no tanks or vehicles are carried.

d. One SRN 5 and one SRN 6 hovercraft at the expense of 14 x 4 ton equivalents.

23

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
SERIAL 11

Notes:

1. These ships are not designed to take part in the assault phase of an amphibious landing and they should not beach until enemy opposition in the area has been overcome. Their primary role, as their name indicates, is a logistic one. Personnel may be lifted ashore by helicopters, or landing craft from other ships, if required in the initial assault. Vehicles can be unloaded at anchor, if essential, into LCMs operating to the LSL stern ramp.
2. LSLs have no ship's helicopter but a helicopter operating platform with one spot, a day and night operating capability and refuelling facilities. Helicopters can also use the spot on the vehicle deck if it is not covered with vehicles.

5. HMAS SYDNEY. Originally constructed as a conventional aircraft carrier she was converted to the fast military transport role in 1962. She can embark:

a. Up to 550 men. For periods of up to 3 weeks this figure can be increased to 900. Under extremely austere conditions it could be increased to 1,200, but this should be avoided if possible.

b. 2,000 tons of military stores or 1,000 tons and 36 x 4 vehicle equivalents.

c. Six helicopters which can be operated from the ship in a troop lift role. Additional helicopters can be ferried at no expense of the vehicle military stores lift.

d. Six LCM 6 (US) at davits.

6. LKA. An RFA-type amphibious heavy lift ship which will be in service in the RAN in 1973. It can carry 5,000 tons of military stores or 1,000 tons and 110 x 4 ton vehicle equivalents. It can carry 20 MBTs at the expense of 40 x 4 ton equivalents. It carries 4 LCM 8 and has a helicopter deck. It has a troop lift of approx 150 (primary vehicle drivers); 300 in overload conditions.

7. LCH. (Similar to US LCU). Maximum speed 10 K. A 300 ton displacement ocean going craft which can carry 200 tons of equipment/stores over 1,500 miles. Its vehicle capacity is two main battle tanks or eight 4 ton vehicle equivalents. Each craft has accommodation for approximately 20 vehicle crew members.

8. LCM 6. Can carry 80 fully equipped troops or 29 tons, one armoured vehicle (up to 29 tons) or 1 x 4 ton vehicle and trailer, at a speed of 9 K. Six are carried in HMAS SYDNEY.

9. LCM 8. Four carried in LKA. Each will carry 200 armed troops, a medium tank, 2 x 4 ton vehicles and trailers or 61 tons freight. Maximum speed loaded is 10 K.

10. LCM 9. Four are carried in the dock of the LPD. Each will carry either 2 tanks, 4 x 4 ton equivalents plus 2 trailers, 8 x $\frac{1}{4}$ ton plus trailers, about 70 tons stores or 250 troops. Their maximum speed is $9\frac{1}{2}$ K.

11. LCVP. Four are carried at davits by the LPH and the LPD. Its maximum speed is 9 K. Each can carry 35 fully equipped troops or 1 x $\frac{1}{4}$ ton vehicle plus 1 x $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trailer.

ESTADO MAYOR ... DE LA ARMADA FOLIO 24 C.O.A.C.

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
SERIAL 11

12. DUKW. Five may be carried in the LPD. They have a maximum speed of 5 K in water and 50 mile/hour on land. Each can carry 25 troops or 2½ tons of stores.

13. Hovercraft. A Hovercraft Squadron RCT consists of a HQ, 2 troops and a REME workshop. Each troop is equipped with a SRN 5 and a SRN 6. Characteristics are as follows:

	SRN 5	SRN 6
Length	38 ft	48 ft
Width	23 ft	23 ft
Speed	54 K	54 K
Payload	7,000 lbs	7,000 lbs
Crew	3	3
Troops	16	30
Unladen weight	10,000 lbs	15,000 lbs
Armament	GPMG	GPMG
Endurance	4 hours	4 hours
Fuel consumption	60 gals AVTUR/hour	60 gals AVTUR/hour

NOTES ON SHIPS

1. Details of all RN Ships and RFAs taking part in Operation JOINT ACCOUNT are contained in the RNSC Data Book. The necessary planning data and operationa and RNZN Ships is contained in subsequent paragraphs.

2. Data.

Ship Type	Attack Carrier	Attack Troop Transport	DDG	DD	Support Ship	Attack Cargo Ship
Class/Name	MELBOURNE	SYDNEY	BRISBANE HOBART	VAMPIRE VENDETTA	STALWART	'NONAME'
Deep Displacement (tons)	20,000	20,000	4,500	3,600	10,000	15,000
Maximum Draught (ft)	26	26	18	18	21	23
Maximum Length (ft)	700	700	400	390	515	600
Maximum Speed (K)	26	26	35	30	20	20
Economical Speed (K)	14	14	15	14	12	12
Endurance - Econ Sp (nm)	8,000	8,000	4,500	3,800	5,500	7,500
- 25k (nm)	4,500	4,500	3,000	2,250	-	-
FFO/DIESO For Propulsion (tons)	3,000	3,000	880	550	1,600	2,500
Average Operational Consumption (tons/day)	200	200	80	90	100	100
Avgas (tons)	800	800	-	-	-	-

Note:

For the following ships similar data should be obtained from the tables for equivalent ships in the RNSC Data Book.

RAN

Advanced Type 12 Frigates
'O' Class Submarines
Coastal Minesweepers (MSC)
Coastal Minehunters (MHC)
HMAS SUPPLY ('Tide' Class Tanker)

RNZN

'Leander' Class Frigate
Type 12 Frigates

3. Operational Notes.

a. HMAS MELBOURNE. The aircraft complement described in Appendix 3 gives the ship a good close air support, surface attack, air defence and ASW cap warning, height finding, air intercept, surface warning and navigation radars provide data for 2 full intercept positions and control of helicopters an The gun armament comprises 4 twin and 4 single 40 mm mountings.

b. HMAS SYDNEY. Appendix 2 contains details of the ship's amphibious capability. The ship's armament comprises 4 single 40 mm guns, the radar outf navigational and combined air/surface warning sets.

c. HMAS BRISBANE and HOBART. These US built DDGs are armed with the TARTAR SAM system, one single 5 in gun mounting, 2 triple ASW torpedo tube moun ASW missile system. An extensive air warning and intercept radar outfit provides data for 2 full intercept positions.

d. HMAS VAMPIRE and VENDETTA. The Australian built 'Daring' class destroyer are armed with 3 twin 4.5 in gun turrets, 2 twin and 2 single 40 mm mou triple barrelled AS Mortar Mk 10. Their combined air/surface and navigational radar can be used to control a helicopter or an LRMR aircraft.

e. Advanced Type 12 Frigates. These ships have similar 4.5 in guns, Seacat SAM and AS Mortar Mk 10 weapon systems to their RN equivalents; they hav missile system in lieu of the MATCH System.

f. HMAS SUPPLY. This 'Tide' class tanker is manned by RAN personnel and has communications and operations room facilities similar to a warship. Sh Air Armament Stores to support HMAS MELBOURNE.

g. HMAS STALWART. The ship is designed to provide repair, maintenance and support facilities for RAN destroyers, frigates and coastal minesweepers/ Armaments consist of 2 twin 40 mm mountings.

h. HMAS 'NONAME'. The amphibious capability of this Attack Cargo Ship which is due to enter service in 1973 is described in Appendix 2.

i. 'Attack' Class Patrol Boats. These patrol boats armed with one single 40 mm mounting, one RFL and two .5 in machine guns are designed for coastal They can also carry one 81 mm mortar for close support of land forces.

j. Other Ships. The operational characteristics of RAN 'O' class Submarines and Coastal Minesweepers/hunters, and RNZN 'Leander' class andType 12 to those of their RN equivalents.

FOLIO 25
C.O.A.C.

FOLIO No 25
C.C.A.C.

COLEGIOS DE ESTADO MAYOR

SERVICIOS CONJUNTOS 2

OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS

"El Ejército Rojo lucha no solamente por luchar, sino para realizar propaganda entre las masas, organizarlas, armarlas, y ayudarlas a establecer el poder político revolucionario. Sin estos objetivos, la lucha pierde su significado y el Ejército Rojo pierde la razón de su existencia" MAO TSE-TUNG 1929.

1. Operaciones Psicológicas (psyops) es una denominación de vasto alcance definida por la OTAN como 'actividades psicológicas planificadas en tiempo de paz y de guerra destinadas a audiencias enemigas, amigas y neutrales con el objeto de crear actitudes y conductas favorables para el logro de objetivos políticos y militares'. En tiempo de guerra las operaciones psicológicas incluyen la guerra psicológica estratégica y táctica y la consolidación psicológica (véase Párrafo 19) y abarca aquellas actividades políticas, militares, económicas, ideológicas y de información destinadas a lograr los resultados deseados.

2. Puede decirse que el concepto de Disuasión es una forma de operación psicológica cuando se relaciona con la definición anterior. Esta forma de operación psicológica no es nueva; gobiernos y comandantes militares han combinado la aplicación de la fuerza con los efectos psicológicos del uso de dicha fuerza a través de las épocas.

3. Entre algunos miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas Británicas existe la tendencia a tratar el asunto con sospechas, hasta con desdén, y a considerar las operaciones psicológicas como una forma de guerra llevada a cabo únicamente por funcionarios políticos y cuerpos militares especializados. La denominación 'operaciones psicológicas' se presta a ser tergiversada, pero no se han encontrado términos me-

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO Nº 26
C.L.A.C.

jores o más descriptivos y la expresión es usada y comprendida internacionalmente.

4. Las operaciones psicológicas pueden afectar a los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas a todos los niveles; las visitas de los buques británicos a puertos del Commonwealth, aliados o extranjeros pueden influir sobre las actitudes locales para nuestra ventaja; el vuelo de un avión de ataque y/o la marcha oportuna a través de un pueblo o un área en dificultades, por las fuerzas militares, pueden, con su presencia, crear una impresión favorable en las mentes de las personas y anticipar disturbios y desórdenes civiles. Las operaciones psicológicas también pueden involucrar a oficiales y hombres individuales, por ejemplo, los prisioneros tomados por una potencia que no es signataria de la Convención de Ginebra han sido explotados, en el pasado, para fines de propaganda. Tampoco debe olvidarse que actividades destinadas principalmente a conquistar la población, a las cuales se hace referencia como tareas de 'Corazones y Mentes', son una forma de operaciones psicológicas. Estas actividades pueden involucrar a cualquier unidad o individuo de las Fuerzas Armadas y adoptan muchas formas diferentes. Actividades de esta naturaleza, bien conducidas, pueden tener una influencia decisiva sobre el resultado exitoso de una campaña de contrainsurgencia o una operación para el mantenimiento de la paz.

5. Por las razones esbozadas más arriba, los comandantes y los oficiales de estado mayor deben apreciar los usos potenciales de las operaciones psicológicas, especialmente contra un fondo de operaciones tácticas en tierra y cuando se contrarresta la insurgencia o un estado de desórden.

LA AMENAZA

6. Los partidos comunistas de la Unión Soviética y la República Popular China nunca han ocultado su objetivo de un comunismo mundial. Libran una continua campaña de propaganda para lograrlo. Cuando los gobiernos y la población son sumisos una campaña de propaganda usando las diversas formas de medios de información disponibles por lo general es suficiente para que consigan sus propósitos. Una vez en

el poder, se imponen los controles necesarios sobre la maquinaria del gobierno, especialmente los medios de información, para mantener un régimen comunista.

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA FOLIO No 27 O. A.

7. Cuando, no obstante, el gobierno y la población civil están contra el comunismo, o se muestran apáticos a su respecto, se hacen necesarias medidas más fuertes. Las mismas pueden adoptar muchas formas, desde el terror y la coacción hasta la persuasión cara a cara llevada a cabo por agentes o revolucionarios dedicados. Al mismo tiempo, pueden realizarse operaciones militares, probablemente en la forma de guerrillas, contra las fuerzas de seguridad del gobierno.

8. Toda vez que se produce un movimiento o una conspiración para derrocar un gobierno o la sociedad establecida, los líderes revolucionarios saben que en el análisis final no pueden triunfar sin conquistar el apoyo de la población civil. Líderes revolucionarios como Lenin y Mao Tse-Tung tenían pleno conocimiento de ésto. Desde que ellos y otros líderes semejantes pasaron sus ideas al papel, los revolucionarios y los insurgentes nacionalistas han dedicado al menos tanto esfuerzo para lograr el éxito político como los militares. Los primeros revolucionarios soviéticos usaron los periódicos para difundir sus doctrinas. En tiempos más modernos, el desarrollo de la radio, y en particular del económico receptor a transistores, les ha provisto el acceso a, y el control de, las facilidades de radiodifusión, un medio de comunicación a través del cual puede influirse en las mentes de millones de personas. Sin lugar a dudas la radio será sustituida por la televisión cuando esta última sea distribuída más ampliamente.

9. Los nacionalistas, ya sean o no comunistas, siguen el patrón general de la guerra revolucionaria comunista, porque ha probado ser un método exitoso de luchar con fuerzas militares superiores y mejor equipadas. También ha demostrado la importancia de afianzar el apoyo y la cooperación voluntaria de la población civil.

10. En las diversas guerras e insurgencias del Siglo XX, muchos países han tardado en reconocer y contrarrestar los métodos adopta-

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 28
C.C.A.C.

dos por elementos hostiles para asegurarse el apoyo activo o al menos, la neutralidad, del pueblo. Con demasiada frecuencia las naciones no han apreciado debidamente el poder y el atractivo de la propaganda hostil y su efecto sobre la mente del pueblo. Con demasiada frecuencia la atención ha sido dirigida a la derrota de la rama militar, en tanto la rama política continuaba con sus enérgicas actividades casi sin oposición. Uno de los ejemplos más notorios en la época posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial es el de los franceses en Indochina, particularmente en Tonkin, ahora parte de Vietnam del Norte, donde, a pesar de la destreza y el valor de las fuerzas militares francesas, su dominio político del país fue socavado por el Viet Minh en casi todas partes.

11. En cualquier Guerra Limitada o insurgencia, el enemigo o el insurgente buscará explotar la situación política tanto como la militar. Usando todas las formas de medios disponibles, por ejemplo, la persuasión cara a cara, la radio, panfletos, etc., tratarán de persuadir a la población civil para que tomen partido. Aquéllos que demuestran simpatía por su causa serán alentados con promesas y se les dará ayuda. Al mismo tiempo, serán explotados para que proporcionen alimentos, alojamiento e información. Aquéllos que no se someten, a menos que estén debidamente protegidos por las fuerzas del gobierno, serán muertos o se verán obligados a huir. Para influir sobre las actitudes de la población civil el enemigo o los insurgentes recurrirán a medidas tales como asesinatos, secuestros y chantaje, y explotarán el temor a la muerte o a daños físicos y otras tácticas que son repugnantes para los países occidentales. Contra una población civil no protegida, métodos semejantes son efectivos y difíciles de resistir.

12. Con los desarrollos en los medios de información masiva logrados desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, toda la humanidad ha quedado expuesta al ataque mental más que nunca. Es inconcebible queen cualquier guerra futura, insurgencia o estado de inquietud, las mentes de aquéllos involucrados no sean influídas por lo que se oye, se ve y se comprende a través de los medios de comunicación masiva.

GENERAL
FOLIO N° 29

13. Una de las tareas del estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas es asesorar al comandante sobre cómo puede contrarrestarse mejor la influencia de la propaganda enemiga o insurgente.

EL ESTADO MAYOR Y LAS UNIDADES DE OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS

ESTADO MAYOR

14. La provisión de oficiales de estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas es una responsabilidad conjunta de las Fuerzas. Los oficiales seleccionados para las designaciones deben tener amplios antecedentes de Fuerza conjunta y,de ser posible, un conocimiento del gobierno civil. El estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas forma parte del estado mayor de operaciones, y debe mantenerse la más estrecha relación con los estados mayores de inteligencia y Relaciones Públicas.

15. Los estados mayores de operaciones psicológicas no existen en un establecimiento determinado; serán incluídos en la mayoría de los comandos de fuerza pero serán pocos. Para ciertas campañas u operaciones, pueden proveerse estados mayores de operaciones psicológicas para comandos inferiores. Un oficial de estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas debe tener la completa confianza de su comandante y preferiblemente acceso directo a él. Para cumplir con su tarea, los oficiales de estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas deben mantenerse actualizados respecto a los desarrollos logrados en la situación operacional y se les debe proveer la inteligencia más reciente.

16. Las principales tareas del estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas pueden resumirse como se indica a continuación:

a. Asesorar al comandante sobre política de operaciones psicológicas.

b. Realizar el planeamiento y la coordinación de una campaña de operaciones psicológicas dentro de su área de responsabilidad.

c. Asesorar al comandante, los estados mayores y las unidades sobre los efectos de la propaganda hostil.

d. Adiestrar a las unidades y el personal de operaciones psicológicas.

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 30

LA UNIDAD DE OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS

17. Bajo la política actual, el Ejército es responsable de proveer el potencial humano y el equipo para las unidades de operaciones psicológicas, aunque en ellas se incluya personal adecuado de las otras Fuerzas. La unidad de operaciones psicológicas es reducida y está equipada con vehículos que llevan altoparlantes, grabadores de cintas, cámaras y, en caso necesario, equipo cinematográfico. Su función principal es la diseminación de propaganda a través de altoparlantes, folletos, fotografías y películas. El trabajo de la unidad no es particularmente especializado pero requiere experiencia y exige iniciativa e imaginación. Su personal debe estar altamente adiestrado en el equipo y en su función de modo de poder explotar las oportunidades repentinas sin demora alguna.

FUNCIONES DE LA ARMADA BRITANICA Y LA REAL FUERZA AEREA BRITANICA

18. Además de las tareas especiales asignadas a la Armada Británica y la Real Fuerza Aérea Británica, como sobrevuelos y demostraciones de poderío militar, habrá ocasiones en que un blanco de operaciones psicológicas sólo podrá ser alcanzado por mar o por aire. El requerimiento más probable de operaciones psicológicas a la Armada Británica serán embarcaciones desde las cuales se desembarcarán los grupos de operaciones psicológicas durante las operaciones frente a la costa y ribereñas. Las embarcaciones interiores y ribereñas que llevan altoparlantes también pueden desempeñar un papel importante y los servicios de costa de los buques navales pueden hacer una valiosa contribución a una campaña de 'Corazones y Mentes'. Para la Real Fuerza Aérea puede existir el requerimiento de aviones que lancen grupos de operaciones psicológicas por aire, que arrojen folletos y que operen altoparlantes sobre áreas dominadas por el enemigo o por insurgentes.

DIVISIONES DE OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS

19. En un estado de guerra o de emergencia declarada las operaciones psicológicas pueden dividirse en:

a. Guerra Psicológica Estratégica. Está dirigida a poblacio-

6-

nes enteras. La política es decidida por el gobierno y entre sus objetivos estará la socavación de la moral y la eficiencia de la nación enemiga y la explicación de nuestra propia política nacional actual a aliados y naciones neutrales.

b. Guerra Psicológica Táctica. Está dirigida a las fuerzas armadas y a los civiles enemigos en la zona de lucha, en apoyo directo de nuestras operaciones militares. Su objetivo es socavar la moral enemiga y debilitar su voluntad de resistir. También busca ganar el apoyo, o al menos la neutralidad, de cualquier población civil que se encuentre en el área de operaciones. La Política de la Guerra Psicológica Táctica será derivada de la Política de la Guerra Psicológica Estratégica.

c. Consolidación Psicológica. Está dirigida totalmente a la población civil. El propósito es influenciar y específicamente ganar la cooperación de los civiles a retaguardia de, o adyacentes a, las fuerzas de combate.

20. Las Operaciones Psicológicas en la Seguridad Interna y en una situación de contrainsurgencia están dirigidas a:

a. Elementos subversivos e insurgentes, para disminuir su moral e inducirlos a desertar.

b. La población civil, para:

(1) Desacreditar a los insurgentes - privándolos así del apoyo civil.

(2) Infundir confianza en, y cooperación con, el Gobierno manteniendo informada a la población de las medidas para derrotar la insurgencia y mejorar su bienestar.

21. La evaluación de sus efectos es difícil; los prisioneros de guerra y los detenidos por lo general proporcionan las mejores indicaciones.

AGENCIAS RELACIONADAS

22. Las operaciones psicológicas tienen estrechos vínculos con:

a. Inteligencia - en la cual están basadas para el grueso

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO Nº 32
C. C. A. C.

de su información.

b. Relaciones Públicas - particularmente respecto a Relaciones de la Comunidad y en la diseminación de información veloz y precisa, de manera de anticipar propaganda hostil.

c. Autoridades Políticas Civiles - dado que todas las operaciones psicológicas deben ser llevadas a cabo dentro de las directivas políticas.

POLITICA PARA OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS

23. Una campaña de operaciones psicológicas puede tener en ocasiones resultados de largo alcance e imprevistos. Así como una cortina de humo puede tener efectos fuera de los límites de un comando de fuerza terrestre y dentro de otro, las operaciones psicológicas no pueden ser realizadas en el aislamiento. La política de operaciones psicológicas para cualquier situación normalmente será decidida al más alto nivel. Cuando se opera en cualquier Commonwealth o país extranjero, será responsabilidad del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y del Ministerio de Commonwealth acordar la política a seguir con el gobierno concerniente y luego emitir guía política para el Comandante de Fuerza. Cuando opera bajo una organización internacional, como las Naciones Unidas o la OTAN, la guía de política debe estar basada en una política consistente y práctica que pueda ser rápidamente comunicada y comprendida. Cuanto más claro sea el mensaje, más fácil será convencer a los receptores. No deben hacerse promesas a menos que sea posible cumplirlas, de otro modo se perderá la credibilidad, la confianza y la efectividad.

24. Los oficiales de estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas, en su planeamiento, asesoramiento y actividades, deben asegurar que se ajustan a las instrucciones contenidas en la guía política. Esto es especialmente importante cuando se trata de la población civil sobre quienes el gobierno local debe tener la responsabilidad final. También se aplica a políticas tales como aquéllas que se ocupan de grupos hostiles o insurgentes. Por ejemplo, si un oficial de estado ma-

de su información.

b. Relaciones Públicas - particularmente respecto a Relaciones de la Comunidad y en la diseminación de información veloz y precisa, de manera de anticipar propaganda hostil.

c. Autoridades Políticas Civiles - dado que todas las operaciones psicológicas deben ser llevadas a cabo dentro de las directivas políticas.

POLITICA PARA OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS

23. Una campaña de operaciones psicológicas puede tener en ocasiones resultados de largo alcance e imprevistos. Así como una cortina de humo puede tener efectos fuera de los límites de un comando de fuerza terrestre y dentro de otro, las operaciones psicológicas no pueden ser realizadas en el aislamiento. La política de operaciones psicológicas para cualquier situación normalmente será decidida al más alto nivel. Cuando se opera en cualquier Commonwealth o país extranjero, será responsabilidad del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y del Ministerio de Commonwealth acordar la política a seguir con el gobierno concerniente y luego emitir guía política para el Comandante de Fuerza. Cuando opera bajo una organización internacional, como las Naciones Unidas o la OTAN, la guía de política debe estar basada en una política consistente y práctica que pueda ser rápidamente comunicada y comprendida. Cuanto más claro sea el mensaje, más fácil será convencer a los receptores. No deben hacerse promesas a menos que sea posible cumplirlas, de otro modo se perderá la credibilidad, la confianza y la efectividad.

24. Los oficiales de estado mayor de operaciones psicológicas, en su planeamiento, asesoramiento y actividades, deben asegurar que se ajustan a las instrucciones contenidas en la guía política. Esto es especialmente importante cuando se trata de la población civil sobre quienes el gobierno local debe tener la responsabilidad final. También se aplica a políticas tales como aquellas que se ocupan de grupos hostiles o insurgentes. Por ejemplo, si un oficial de estado ma-

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ...
FOLIO No 33
O.A.

yor de operaciones psicológicas adopta una decisión sobre términos de rendición propios que pueden convenir a las condiciones locales, puede encontrarse en pugna con la política del gobierno del país en el cual se encuentra. No debe olvidarse que los principios de cooperación y coordinación se aplican tanto a las operaciones psicológicas como a cualquier otra operación militar.

25. En el Anexo A a este resumen se encontrará una posible organización para la conducción de operaciones psicológicas durante una campaña de contrainsurgencia en un país amigo.

CONCLUSION

26. En su contexto militar, y especialmente en el terreno táctico y de consolidación, las operaciones psicológicas no son un sustituto del poder militar; tampoco son un arma para usar cuando todo lo demás ha fracasado. Es otra arma de apoyo de que dispone el comandante y debe ser usada conjuntamente con el poderío militar. El grado de énfasis adjudicado a las operaciones psicológicas en relación con los efectivos militares, variará. En algunas circunstancias el ataque físico, en oposición al ataque mental, será de importancia decisiva; en otras, las operaciones psicológicas pueden recibir prioridad más alta con mayor provecho. Son pocas las operaciones militares en las cuales puede ignorarse el asunto.

Anexo:

A. Posible Organización para una Campaña de Operaciones Militares en un País Amigo.

NOTA:

JSP7 - Operaciones Psicológicas - será publicado en 1971/72 como parte del Manual de Guerra Conjunta.

ESTADO MAYOR GENERAL DE LA ARMADA
FOLIO No 34
C.O.A.C.

POSIBLE ORGANIZACION PARA UNA CAMPAÑA DE OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS EN UN PAIS AMIGO



COMPOSICION DE LA COMISION DE OPERACIONES PSICOLOGICAS

Presidente

Miembros Civiles

Representantes de:

- Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Commonwealth.
- Servicio de Información del Gobierno.
- Ministerio responsable de Asuntos Internos.
- Policía (Rama Especial)

Representante del Gobierno

Miembros Militares

Representantes de:

- Comandante de Fuerza.
- Estado Mayor de Inteligencia.
- Estado Mayor de Operaciones Psicológicas.
- Estado Mayor de Relaciones Públicas.

Miembros Opcionales

Técnicos en sociología, economía, religión e industria, según se requiera.

Asesoramiento = ↑
Guía Política = ↓